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City Council Legislative Committees and 
Policy-making in Large United States 
Cities * 
John P. Pelissero, Loyola University Chicago 
Timothy B. Krebs, Loyola University Chicago 
Theory: Legislative committees are extensive and integral to the structure and pol-
icy-making functions of Congress and state legislatures. Scant research exists on 
current roles of committees of city councils. 
Hypotheses: We hypothesize that city council committee systems are less common 
and not as vital to policy-making than is true of other legislative bodies. Contrary 
to much urban research, we further expect that city government structure, not the 
political environment, shapes development of committee systems and their policy 
roles. 
Methods: Logistic and OLS regression are the methods used to analyze the structure 
of city council committee systems. Differences in policy outputs are analyzed with 
t-tests and OLS regression. Data are from a 1992-93 mail survey of 160 large 
United States cities, and from Census Bureau reports on city government finances. 
Results: Committees are widely used in large cities and their use is directly due 
to structural aspects of city government, particularly size of city council. Broad 
policy-making roles are found to be uncommon, but a substantial part of city legis-
lative business is assigned to committees. Legislative committees have a small 
impact on policy outputs. 
Urban scholars have devoted considerable attention to policy-making 
in United States cities. Much of this research has focused on the environ-
mental influences on policy-making and how reform government structures 
affect city policy (Liebert 1974; Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Morgan and 
Pelissero 1980). By contrast, and despite an apparent increase in their use 
(Svara 1991,44), little is known about city council legislative committees-
where policy initiatives may begin. Compared to extensive study of con-
gressional and state legislative committees, we have minimal knowledge 
of how legislative committees function in the policy-making process on 
the local level. This paper addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing 
legislative committees and their policy-making functions and impact in 
large United States cities, contributing to the renewed interest in research 
*Data for replication of this study are available from the authors. This is a revised version 
of a paper delivered at the Southwestern Political Science Association meeting, San Antonio, 
Texas, March, 1994. 
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on city government institutions (Bledsoe 1993; Clingennayer and Feiock 
1993, 1994). 
Legislative Committee Structures and Policy 
The purposes of legislative committees can be understood in the gen-
eral context of structural-functionalism (e.g., Gulick 1937) and the specific 
behavior of legislative bodies (Wilson 1981). With few studies available on 
city council committees, the literature on congressional and state legislative 
committees is a logical beginning for understanding committee structures 
and functions in our research. 
Congressional Committees 
At a simple level, committees were created to enable the larger Con-
gress and state legislative chambers to manage their policy-making duties 
more efficiently and effectively (Cooper 1970; Gamm and Shepsle 1989). 
Committees and subcommittees and their leaders serve as gatekeepers, re-
positories of expertise, and policy incubators, causing other members to 
defer to them when making collective decisions (Hall and Evans 1990; 
Smith and Deering 1984). In addition to their policy-making duties, Fenno 
(1973) argues that committees serve as political instruments for legislators 
seeking to satisfy personal goals such as reelection, power within the cham-
ber, and influence over public policy. 
Empirical studies of congressional committees are supported by a for-
mal literature suggesting that reelection-seeking members (Mayhew 1974) 
move the committee system in directions favoring their personal goals, of-
ten to the detriment of congressional policy-making. Distributive theorists 
argue that members self-select onto particular committees that favor reelec-
tion constituencies, creating bias in the assignment process and, more im-
portantly, in congressional policy-making (Shepsle 1978). Deference to 
committee expertise leads to logrolling between committees, which ulti-
mately protects committees' policy interests. In addition to their gatekeep-
ing or ex ante powers, committees composed of "preference outliers" also 
are powerful because of their effect on conference committees created to 
iron out differences between House and Senate bills. In situations where 
the chamber's majority votes against (rolls) the wishes of the committee's 
majority, committee leaders have a second chance (in conference) to move 
the bill back toward the committee's original position. This so-called "ex 
post veto" power of committees gives them leverage over outcomes on 
conference reports, which typically receive only an up or down vote in the 
full chamber (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Thus, congressional policy-
making is dominated by powerful committees who control both the agenda 
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setting phase of policy-making and the final stages of the legislative pro-
cess. 
Distributive theory has been challenged by those who argue that legis-
latures have objectives of their own and mechanisms available to them to 
channel the self-interests of their members in ways preferred by the organi-
zation. This theory of legislative organization suggests that Congress con-
trols committees, not vice versa. Krehbiel (1991) presents evidence re-
jecting the ideas that legislators self-select onto committees and that 
committees are composed of preference outliers whose legislative demands 
diverge significantly from parent chamber majorities. Political parties and 
party leaders control committee assignments and work to create an environ-
ment that "efficiently taps the special talents of its legislators" (Krehbiel 
1991, 136). Members are encouraged by leaders to specialize in specific 
policy areas because specialization creates expertise that is used to better 
inform the legislature. "Organization of informative committees by a ratio-
nallegislature is not a process culminating in committees that are composed 
of preference outliers" (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990, 558). In response to 
claims that committees disproportionately control the legislative process 
(especially in the post-conference stage), Krehbiel (1987, 935) argues that 
committee power is constrained to a large degree by parent chamber powers 
such as the "discharge petition, open rules, and amendments between the 
houses." This perspective is consistent with historical interpretations of 
the development of legislative committees as mechanisms through which 
legislatures are educated on matters of public policy (see Cooper 1970; 
Gamm and Shepsle 1989) and is consistent with a structural-functionalist 
interpretation. 
State Legislative Committees 
Committees' structures and roles in state legislatures are similar to 
those in Congress, but vary extensively from state to state. Compared to 
congressional committees, state committee systems are relatively weak and 
are controlled, for the most part, by party leaders (Patterson 1990, 185). 
Despite their weaknesses, scholars have shown that legislative committees 
have been transformed in recent years and now are the true workhorses of 
state legislatures (Rosenthal 1990, 45). State legislative committees serve 
traditional functions of investigating, proposing, debating, and recommend-
ing legislation to the parent chamber (Hamm 1980), and legislators have 
come to depend upon the expertise of committee members (Patterson 1990, 
190). They are disadvantaged by internal rules, such as discharge petitions 
that make it easy for parent chambers to penetrate committees and remove 
bills for floor consideration, a common practice among city councils, also. 
Higher membership turnover rates in state legislatures relative to Congress 
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also inhibit policy specialization, thus reducing the likelihood that these 
committees will institutionalize (Basehart 1980). 
A more developed legislative committee system is often a sign of legis-
lative professionalism (Bowman and Kearney 1988; Grumm 1971). By de-
veloping committees, legislatures are often establishing a structure that can 
lead to a better functioning and informed legislative process. More commit-
tees help to manage the legislative workload, provide for study of legisla-
tive proposals, and enhance the expertise among legislators. It is not entirely 
clear from the literature whether the development of a large committee 
system to further its legislative capacity is to counter strong executive 
power, develop expertise when the executive branch is small or the gover-
nor weak, or simply occurs in concert with greater professionalism in state 
government (see, for example, Mooney 1995). But clearly, a more devel-
oped committee system improves the policy-making resources of the legis-
lature. 
City Councils and Legislative Committees 
Unlike congressional and state legislative committees that play signifi-
cant policy roles, surveys point to more limited policy functions and legisla-
tive roles for city council committees (DeSantis 1987; Svara 1991). Much 
of the variation in city councils' use of committees appears related to struc-
tural or political factors (and to a lesser extent, environmental ones), in 
particular cities. First, city councils' use of committees is likely to vary 
with council size. We expect larger cities to have more council members 
and thus a greater need to accommodate a variety of individual and collec-
tive policy goals. Larger cities also are more likely to use committees for 
policy-making because they are expected to face greater demands from the 
public to address a broader range of issues than those faced by smaller cities 
(DeSantis 1987, 3; Svara 1991, 44). The effect of city size on committee use 
and policy-making may be mitigated somewhat by the structure of city 
government. Cities with reform structures (e.g., council-manager govern-
ment, nonpartisan councils, at-large council elections) are less likely to 
need committees (DeSantis 1987,3; Svara 1991,45) because councils are 
smaller and policy-making is centered in the professional bureaucracy and 
city manager's office, and not in the city council. Further, a rational city 
council would probably have a developed committee system if the city had 
a weak mayor-council form of government. In such a situation, the coun-
cil's need for information would dictate the organization of a committee 
system to achieve the expertise warranted for policy-making in a weak 
executive environment (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). When mayors have 
strong powers in a mayor-council form of government, the policy-making 
expertise would reside in the executive branch; city councils would create 
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developed committee systems only to counter the policy-making power of 
the executive (Mooney 1995). Thus, different governmental structures en-
able cities to balance (albeit in different ways) the demands placed on them 
by government organization and the public to produce policy outputs that 
satisfy the community. 
A second factor affecting cities' committee structure is the nature of 
council work. City councils in all but the largest jurisdictions are part-time 
bodies and thus meet less frequently in their official capacity than full-time 
councils. Their members have other occupations besides the city council 
and therefore less time to devote to committee work. Council members are 
likely to be volunteers motivated by feelings of civic obligation rather than 
a desire to exercise power or build political careers (Prewitt 1970). This 
expectation presumes, however, that larger communities will place greater 
demands on city councils, which, in turn, will meet more frequently and 
conduct more of their legislative business in committees. We suggest that 
city councils meeting more frequently do so because the volume of de-
mands placed on them by the public is sufficient to warrant more "official" 
attention to city issues. Because councils meeting more frequently are likely 
to confront a broader range of issues, we expect to see more sophisticated 
committee systems to manage them. 
Third, like other legislative committees, council committees may serve 
valuable political functions for city councilors. Committees may facilitate 
members' representational roles and styles (Bledsoe 1993). Eulau and Pre-
witt (1973) showed that representational role orientations of city council 
members are likely to influence the development and functions of commit-
tees in city councils. Welch and Bledsoe (1988, 77) argued that members 
elected at-large view the city as their primary constituency, whereas mem-
bers from districts tend to focus more on the neighborhood or area from 
which they are elected. The different representational focus of these mem-
bers may motivate them to create and use committees to help their constit-
uents, promote themselves, and claim credit for district projects (Mayhew 
1974). This may alter the perceived importance of committees because a 
particular committee assignment may bring representational advantages to 
members elected from districts that members elected at-large would not 
realize. 
Research showing that council members are active in addressing con-
stituent concerns, especially in the area of economic development, has im-
plications for committee organization. Citizens contact councilors about 
development issues more frequently when these issues are highly salient, 
have media attention, councilors are full-time, and members represent dis-
tricts (Clingermayer and Feiock 1994,463). Councilors can be more effec-
tive in providing personal services to constituents from a committee posi-
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tion or chairmanship, and thus place more emphasis on using committees 
to meet their representational goals. 
A final component of this study asks what difference committees make 
to city policy outputs. Svara (1991, 45) learned that while policy functions 
have expanded in council committees, more than 40% of cities do not use 
committees for such basic legislative functions as proposing legislation or 
conducting public hearings. Another survey also revealed that the amount 
of legislative business conducted by city council committees is low, except 
in the largest cities (DeSantis 1987, 8). Overall, the influence of city coun-
cils and their committees on policy matters has been found to be limited 
compared to other legislative bodies (Svara 1990). City council policy-
making roles appear to vary with city size-councils in larger cities have 
more important roles. 
Previous research has pointed to the importance of structural and envi-
ronmental variables in determining levels of city taxing, spending, and bor-
rowing (Dye 1967; Farnham 1986; Liebert 1974; Lineberry and Fowler 
1967; Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Sharp 1986). Despite a lengthy debate 
in the literature over this question, the bulk of the evidence suggests that 
city fiscal policy is largely a function of cities' environmental conditions-
income, region, fiscal strain, population change-rather than cities' politi-
cal structures (Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Morgan and Watson 1995). Re-
cent research on economic development policy, however, has shown the 
importance of political structures in this policy area. Sharp (1991, 144) 
reported that unreformed cities with formal political structures for citizen 
input responded to conditions of economic distress with specific economic 
development policies more frequently than reformed cities. Fleischmann, 
Green, and Kwong (1992, 683) found that cities with specialized political 
structures for economic development were significantly more active in pro-
moting economic development policies than cities without such structures. 
Similarly, one might expect that city policy is related to the institutional 
structures for creating policy within councils. Committees, especially those 
with jurisdiction over distributive policy, facilitate logrolling on legislation 
and may increase spending. This leads one to ask if city councils with more 
committees spend more money, both overall and in specific policy areas, 
than city councils with fewer committees? Do city councils with particular 
types of committees (e.g., parks and recreation) spend more money in dis-
tributive policy areas (e.g., parks) than on policies of citywide importance 
(e.g., hospitals)? In other words, do committee members' preferences domi-
nate policy outputs in cities rather than the wishes of the council in general 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987)? City council committees, via public hearings 
and deliberations, also provide public access to policy-making. Does this 
greater access result in larger public expenditures? Our study goes beyond 
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the limitations of earlier work to address these policy questions as we at-
tempt to understand city council committee structures, functions, and im-
pacts. 
Research Design 
A survey on city council legislative committees' roles in policy-making 
was mailed during 1992-93 to 187 city clerks whose cities had 1990 popu-
lations of 100,000 or more. Following three mailings, we received re-
sponses from 160 of these cities, or 85.6%. This sample represents large 
cities from each region and nearly every state. Large cities are more likely 
to have legislative committees because their city councils are larger and 
more fully-engaged in legislative work on a daily basis. 
Our dependent variables are derived from survey responses to the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. Does your city council use legislative committees? 
2. How many legislative committees exist? 
3. What legislative functions do committees perform? 
4. How much of the council's legislative business is conducted in com-
mittees? 
A final question is examined with secondary data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (1994): 
5. What are the policy outcomes associated with legislative commit-
tees? 
We hypothesize that the above variables will be associated with or 
predicted by several key independent variables. Unlike most studies of city 
policy and government structure, we expect that environmental forces will 
be less significant determinants of city council committee organization and 
roles. Rather, the structure of city government should largely determine 
whether cities have legislative committees, the number of committees, and 
the policy-related functions of these committees. For this reason, we look 
to aspects of city government structure to be the key determinants of com-
mittee roles. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we expect that size of city councils 
will determine the use of committees and their policy roles. Larger city 
councils are hypothesized to rely more on committees. Second, we hypothe-
size that the relative time that city council members devote to legislative 
affairs should affect committee functions. We use frequency of city council 
meetings as a proxy measure for full-time councils and expect that councils 
that meet more often will use more committees. Third, a rational city coun-
cil would organize committees under conditions of weak executive powers. 
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We believe that mayor-council governments with weak mayors will be 
more likely to have committees than in more powerful executive systems. 
We expect reform-style governments to have a negative effect on the use 
and number of committees and to reduce the amount of legislative business 
and range of policy functions performed by committees. We measure re-
form as an additive index with values ranging from 0-7. 1 Specifically, 
council-manager governments, nonpartisan councils, and those with at-
large representation systems are expected to have less reliance on commit-
tees. Unreformed structures should have more committees and more uses 
for such. 
We expect larger .cities to rely more on committees and have included 
population in 1990 as a predictor variable. Because city councils in the 
northeast region are generally larger and more often unreformed, we expect 
to find regional differences in the use of committees, with northeast cities 
having more committees with broad functional responsibilities. Finally, we 
expect structure of council committee systems to affect policy outputs in 
large cities. Cities with committees and more developed committee struc-
tures should have significantly different policy outcomes than cities with 
less developed committee systems. 
Analysis 
The 160 cities responding to our survey include 81 council-manager 
systems (50.6%), 78 mayor-council governments (48.7%), and one com-
mission government. Most of the cities have a nonpartisan electoral system 
(77%), with members serving two (24%), three (4%), or four-year (72%) 
terms. Considerable variation in the method of representation is apparent: 
a plurality (41 %) used a mixture of district and at-large seats, while exclu-
sive use of at-large seats was found in 31 % and districts were used in 28%. 
The size of city councils in these cities ranges from four to 50 members, 
with the modal number of council members being seven. Regular meetings 
of these cities' councils are held weekly (51 %) or twice a month (46%). 
Use of Committees 
The survey revealed that 70% of cities over 100,000 population have 
legislative committees, while 30%, or 48 cities, do not. Unreformed cities 
(mayor-council government, district representation, nonpartisan elections) 
are more likely to use committees than those that have adopted one or all 
J REFORM is a seven-point scale based upon the degree to which classic reform ele-
ments are present in a city. The presence of council-manager government, at-large representa-
tion, and nonpartisan ship is scored as 7, none of the above is scored as 0, and various combi-
nations of each with unreformed elements are scored between 1 and 6. 
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of the three key elements of municipal reform. For example, mayor-council 
cities are decidedly more favorable to committees (86%) than council-
manager governments (56%).2 Similarly, 89% of partisan cities use com-
mittees, compared to 65% of nonpartisan communities.3 Incorporation of 
the reform-style method of city council representation also reduces the like-
lihood of having legislative committees. Only half of at-large representation 
systems use committees, but 84% of district systems and 76% of mixed 
systems employ committees.4 
In general, the likelihood of having committees decreases with the pres-
ence of more reformed government features. As expected, when we convert 
ballot type, form of. government, and representation method to a seven-
point scale, all cities without any element of reform (n = 11) have commit-
tees. In fact, 86 to 100% of cities with reform index values of 0 to 3 use 
committees, compared to only 38% of those at the top of the reform scale 
(7).5 
Smaller city councils-those with 11 or fewer members-are less in-
clined to use committees than larger ones. Indeed, every city with a councii 
size of 12 or more has a system of legislative committees. Among small 
councils-with four to seven members-48% have committees. Council 
time-the frequency of council meetings-affects use of committees, also. 
The more time devoted to council work, the more likely a city is to use 
committees. Seventy-three percent of councils that meet weekly have com-
mittees, compared to 67% of councils meeting less often. Finally, some 
association between committee use and environmental variables is ob-
served. Committees are used by nearly all of the largest cities (populations 
of 300,000+). Committees are also more likely to be used by city councils 
in the northeast region (90%). 
We tested the effects of these independent variables in three logistic 
regression models in which responses to a question' 'Does your city council 
use legislative committees?" is the dependent variable. Table 1 shows an 
initial model in which council size is the only independent variable. Size 
of council is significant and alone correctly predicts 77% of the cases. The 
second model includes two additional exogenous structural variables-
council time (frequency of formal council sessions) and our reform index. 
Each of the predictors is significant and model 2 correctly predicts 80% of 
the cases, increasing the proportional reduction in error to 30%. Model 3, 
in which the environmental variables, population and region,6 are included, 
2X2 = 19.77 (2 df), p < .0001. 
3X2 = 7.46 (l df), p < .01. 
4X2 = 14.73 (2 df), p < .001. 
5Gamma = -.55; X2 = 26.79 (7 df), p < .001. 
6REGION is a dummy variable for Northeast = 1, Other = O. 
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Table 1. Logit Models for Use of Standing Committees 
by City Councils, 1992-93 
Predictors Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Council Size 0.546*** 0.458*** 0.411 *** 
(0.116) (0.122) (0.128) 
Council Time 0.829* 0.666 
(0.383) (0.420) 
Reform -0.268* -0.240* 
(0.120) (0.122) 
Population 0.003 
(0.002) 
Region 0.663 
(0.886) 
Constant -3.538*** -4.476* -4.487* 
(0.882) (1.828) (1.990) 
Model Chi-square (df) 42.137 (1)*** 49.96 (3)*** 56.88 (5)*** 
Correctly Predicted 77% 80% 80% 
Prop. Reduction in Error 22.9% 30.4% 32.6% 
N 160 157 157 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (standard errors). 
correctly predicts 80% of the cases, and shows a modest increase in the 
proportional reduction in error coefficient, also. Only council size and re-
form have significant coefficients, however. Overall, the size of the council 
is the best predictor of whether a city will use committees, but the addition 
of other structural variables, including reform and council time, enhances 
the predictive power of the model. Regional differences and population do 
not have a direct impact on the use of committees. 
We estimated the probability of size of council predicting committee 
use with the output from model 3. Using the logit coefficients and mean 
values for the independent variables, we then estimated the likelihood of 
having committees by varying council size by one standard deviation from 
its mean position.7 Table 2 shows that an average size council of 10 mem-
bers has an 87% probability of using legislative committees. A below aver-
age council of just four members would have only a 35% chance of having 
committees. Virtually every council whose size would be one or more stan-
dard deviations above the mean size would have council committees. These 
findings confirm the importance of structure in predicting the use of legisla-
7Fonnula: Constant + (B(Council Size) * Mean(Council Size)) + (B(Council Time) * 
Mean(Council Time)) + (B(Reform) * Mean(Reform)) + (B(Population) * Mean(Popula-
tion)) + (B(Region) * Mean(Region)). Mean for Council Size is varied ~ 1 s.d. 
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Table 2. Estimated Probabilities for Use of Legislative Committees 
Under City Councils of Varying Sizes 
City Council Size Range 
Below Average 
Average 
Above Average 
Large 
City Council Size 
4 
10 
16 
22 and above 
Probability of 
Committees (%) 
35 
87 
99 
100 
Notes: Logit tests controlling for council time, reform, population, region. 
Council size is varied by one standard deviation in each example. 
Mean size = 9.85, standard deviation = 6.24 (n = 157). 
tive committees and validates the significant findings of the log it models 
shown in Table 1. 
Development of Committee Systems 
Significant variation is found in the level of committee system develop-
ment in these cities. Although we found cities to have as many as 31 legisla-
tive committees, the group average was five committees, with six as the 
most common number. Committees have between two and 13 members, 
but the mean "average number of committee members" is 4.5. Typically, 
committee membership is determined by council leaders (46%) or mayors 
(30%). Seniority is used rarely (7%) in the committee assignment process 
in these cities. 
Table 3 presents two models predicting the number of committees in 
city councils. In model 1 (which has only structural variables) council size 
is the strongest predictor of the number of committees (Beta = .52), show-
ing that larger councils have more committees. Also of significance are 
council time and the term of council members; councils meeting more fre-
quently and those with shorter terms are shown to have more committees. 
Reform is not significant in this model, which accounts for 31 % of the 
variation. Model 2 adds the environmental variables, population and region, 
to the equation. Although council size remains the best predictor, council 
time, council terms, popUlation, and region are all significant predictors. 
In explaining 37% of the variation with this model, we find that larger 
councils, meeting more frequently, located in the Northeast, and having 
larger popUlations are apt to have more developed committee systems. 
Institutional Structure and Legislative Committees 
Given the findings in Tables 1, 2, and 3 that demonstrate the over-
whelming importance of institutional structure on legislative committee use 
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Table 3. Regression Models for Number of Standing Committees 
in City Councils, 1992-93 
Modell Model 2 
Predictors B (S.E.) Beta B (S.E.) Beta 
Council Size 0.445*** .519 0.357*** .416 
(.065) (.068) 
Council Time 2.007** .218 1.738** .189 
(.638) (.635) 
Council Terms -1.070* -.170 -0.988* -.157 
(.424) (.423) 
Reform .0.130 -.055 -0.032 -.013 
(.178) (.177) 
Population 0.003** .230 
(.001) 
Region 2.970* .178 
(1.198) 
Constant -1.872 -2.015 
(3.064) (3.168) 
Adj R2 .31 .37 
F 18.28*** 15.62*** 
N 153 153 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
and development of committee systems, a closer look at the impact of city 
government form is warranted. What are the effects of mayoral power on 
committee systems? We examined mayor-council cities (n = 78) more 
closely to assess the impact of strong versus weak mayors on city council 
structures. We have already established that 86% (n = 67) of mayor-council 
cities use legislative committees. Most cities with a strong mayor (90%) 
have a city council committee system, while just 72% of weak mayor sys-
tems have a committee system. 
Analyzing the relationship between mayoral power and committee sys-
tems in an inferential fashion, we discover few significant findings. The 
Pearson correlation between mayoral power (coded 0 for weak, 1 for 
strong) and the presence of a committee system is -.17 (n.s). Similarly, 
the relationship between structure of the committee system (number of leg-
islative committees) and mayoral power is also weak and negative (r = 
- .15, n.s.). It is clear from these correlations that strong mayor executive 
branches do not exert a significant influence on committee systems, at least 
not one that is different from weak mayor systems. Part of the reason for 
this is that mayor-council governments are also more likely to have large 
city councils (r = .35, p :::; .01). The structural influence has more to do 
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with the form of government and size of the city council than the power 
of the mayor within that structure. 
Similarly, we studied the influence of other structural features more 
closely. One of our interests stems from the thesis that committee systems 
may advance the political or electoral interests of a legislator's district. 
As shown earlier, cities with district representation are most likely to use 
committees (84%), followed by mixed systems (76%), and then at-large 
systems (50%). Do district representational structures lead to a more devel-
oped committee structure within city councils? The correlation between a 
district dummy variable and size of committee systems is weak and not 
significant (r = .14). Therefore, although legislative committees are sig-
nificantly more likely to be present under district-style structures, councils 
with district representatives do not have more developed legislative com-
mittees. Under such circumstances, committees are unlikely to be used for 
political or electoral objectives of council members. 
We also examined the additive effects of structure on legislative com-
mittee systems. In a multiple regression model that included six structural 
predictors: mayoral power, method of representation, partisanship, size of 
council, council terms, and time devoted to council duties, we were able 
to explain 36% of the variation in size of the legislative committee system. 
The only significant predictor was size of the council, however, which posi-
tively determined larger committee systems. None of the other structural 
variables came close to achieving statistical significance. At this point it 
appears that mayoral power, district representation, and traditional reform 
have no significant independent effect on the development of council com-
mittee systems. 
Policy Functions of Committees 
One of the most understudied areas of city council legislative processes 
is the policy role of committees. Focusing on the 112 cities with commit-
tees, we explore policy functions and outputs of committees. We identified 
five major policy functions of legislative committees and asked responding 
cities to indicate if their committees performed each function. Most cities 
use their committees to study proposed legislation (90%) and they spend 
an average of 40% of committee time performing this function. Committees 
spend nearly equal shares of time evaluating current programs (68%) or 
proposing legislation (67%). Slightly more than 20% of committee work, 
on average, is devoted to each of these functions. Somewhat surprisingly, 
conducting public hearings on issues occurs in only about half of the cities, 
which on average spend less than 19% of their time on hearings. Further, 
legislative oversight of the executive branch is performed in just 35% of 
committees. 
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What detennines the range of policy roles for committees? A composite 
function index that measures the range of policy functions (1 to 5) per-
fonned by committees was constructed and studied for association with a 
number of structural and environmental factors. The best correlates of pol-
icy roles are refonn and number of committee members. The greater the 
degree of municipal refonn, the less likely committees are to study bills, 
conduct hearings, or perfonn oversight. Having refonn features, in general, 
decreases the range of policy-related tasks found among the committees. 
As Svara (1990) has noted, this is likely due to executive dominance of 
councils in council-manager and strong mayor cities. Fonn of government 
is negatively associate;d with several policy functions, indicating a signifi-
cant relationship between mayor-council governments and higher propor-
tions of cities conducting oversight and public hearings. 
Larger city councils and larger average membership on committees 
significantly increase the share of cities with broader policy functions. Both 
public hearings and oversight are significantly correlated with council and 
committee size. Although council time is not correlated with policy tasks, 
committee meeting frequency is associated with broader policy functions, 
particularly in the area of public hearings. Environmental variables had 
little effect on committee policy roles. Although structural variables are 
far better correlates of committee policy functions, few have significant 
correlations and we did not pursue a multivariate model of specific policy 
roles. 
Committees and Legislative Business 
Respondents were asked how much of the policy-making business of 
the city council is conducted in committees. An average of 56% of legisla-
tive business is performed by committees in these cities. Table 4 shows 
regression models for the proportion of city council policy-making per-
fonned by committees regressed on three key predictors. In Modell, two 
structural variables-council size and the policy function index-are used 
to predict policy-making by committees. Both predictors are significant, 
indicating that larger city councils and committee systems with broader 
policy-making functions handle more policy business for their city coun-
cils. (Other structural variables had very low correlations with this endoge-
nous variable and were not used in the model.) Only one environmental 
variable-population-is correlated with the proportion of policy-making 
perfonned by committees. Model 2 shows, however, that this variable has 
no significant effect on the amount of policy-making done by committees. 
Although the models are significant, they account for only a small portion 
of the variation in committee policy-making. 
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Table 4. Regression Models for Proportion of City Council 
Policy-making by Committees, 1992-93 
Modell Model 2 
Predictors B (S.E.) Beta B (S.E.) 
Council Size 1.249* .257 1.313* 
(.500) (.527) 
Function Index 7.616** .275 7.680** 
(2.850) (2.869) 
Population -0.003 
(.007) 
Constant 15.405 15.664 
(11.077) (11.153) 
Adj R2 .15 .14 
F 8.05*** 5.36** 
N 84 84 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Committees and Policy Outcomes 
Beta 
.270 
.278 
-.044 
Finally, what are the policy consequences of city council legislative 
committees? To answer this question, we collected budget data for city 
general expenditures and seven policy areas for 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1994) and began by comparing per capita (p.c.) spending in cities 
with committees to cities without committees. Table 5 displays our results. 
The first analysis shows that spending in cities with committees is 
$1,043 p.c., but is much lower ($854 p.c.) in cities without committees. T-
tests were performed and this difference in spending is significant and sug-
gests that higher spending is found in cities with legislative committee sys-
tems. Analysis 2 reveals that cities with more developed (larger) committee 
systems have significantly higher average spending than cities with smaller 
committee systems. Regression analysis (not shown) confirms that general 
expenditures are $28 higher for each additional committee.8 When we con-
trol for other structural and environmental variables, however, the commit-
tee variable is no longer significant, indicating that other predictors are 
associated with city spending per capita. 
We expected that spending would be higher in functional areas that 
have committees responsible for policy-making for that function, particu-
larly where committees could be used to increase distributive policy spend-
8b = +$28.44, p < .01. 
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Table 5. Policy Impact of City Council Committees: Average Per 
Capita Expenditures, 1992 (N) 
Cities without 
council 
Analysis Policy Area Cities with council committees committees 
General $1,043.29+ (110) $853.61 + (47) 
Expenditures 
Cities with Cities with 
large committee small committee 
systems! systems 2 
2 General $1,152.14* (72) $837.04* (38) nla 
Expenditures 
Cities with Cities without Cities without 
a functional a functional council 
committee committee committees 
3 Police $145.70 (51) $143.17 (58) $140.07 (47) 
4 Fire $ 95.22+ (51) $ 85.10+ (59) $ 81.32 (47) 
5 Highways $ 85.37 (36) $ 86.82 (74) $ 86.30 (47) 
6 Housing and $ 76.49 (54) $ 39.38** (56) $ 66.27 (47) 
Community 
Development 
7 Parks and $ 89.43 (22) $ 69.87 (88) $ 73.80 (47) 
Recreation 
8 Sewerage $ 86.05 (42) $ 90.21 (68) $ 6l.58** (47) 
9 Solid Waste $ 50.19 (42) $ 43.13 (68) $ 50.06 (47) 
lCities with six or more committees. 
2Cities with one to five committees. 
+t-test p :=; .10; *t-test p :=; .05; **t-test p :=; .01. 
ing. Analyses 3 to 9 display policy outcomes under three different commit-
tee structures: (1) cities that have a functional committee in this policy area, 
(2) cities without a functional area committee, and (3) cities without council 
committees. The analyses demonstrate that only two policy areas are af-
fected by the presence of a functional committee. Budgets for fire depart-
ments and housing and community development programs are significantly 
higher where the city council has a related functional committee. None of 
the other policy areas had significantly different spending based upon the 
presence of a functional committee. And sewer policy is the only budget 
area with significantly lower average spending in cities without committees. 
(Regression analysis reveals that this finding is attributable to regional dif-
ferences, not committees.) 
Based upon the (-tests performed on average per capita spending in 
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these municipal policy areas, inferential analysis was not expected to reveal 
much. Correlational analysis confirms that the existence of a functional 
committee related to a policy area is associated with higher spending in 
just two areas: (l) cities with public safety committees have modestly 
higher fire spending (r = .17) and (2) cities with housing or development 
committees have higher housing and community development spending (r 
= .16) (p ::::; .05). Multivariate regression (not shown) using the functional 
committee as a predictor of policy spending, along with other structural 
and environmental variables, shows that only the existence of a housing 
or development committee significantly predicts higher average per capita 
spending in this policy area. This analysis shows that when controlling for 
use of committees, size of council, policy functions of committees, struc-
ture, region, and population, the presence of a housing committee will in-
crease housing and community development budgets by about $33 p.c. In 
general, committees may have their greatest impact in increasing city bud-
gets overall, while having more limited impact on specific policy areas. 
Discussion 
Expectations about council committees and their impact can be drawn 
from the more developed scholarship on national and state legislative com-
mittees; however, that research does not fit city council committees well. 
In fact, the structure of city governments creates conditions for varied use 
and different policy roles among cities with council committees. Our study 
has shown that most large cities employ legislative committees but their use 
varies due to structural, not environmental, variables. As we hypothesized, 
environmental variables, such as population size and region, mattered little 
in the organization of committees, contrary to other research on urban polit-
ical structure (e.g., Hawkins 1971). But structure-particularly council size 
and reformism-made a difference. As expected, the use of committees 
was found to be greater in mayor-council cities and in cities with district 
methods of city council representation. Cities with district representation 
systems, whose members have a different representational focus than at-
large members (Prewitt 1970; Welch and Bledsoe 1988), tend to be associ-
ated with greater numbers of committees. Time devoted to council work 
also made a difference; as anticipated, committees were more widely used 
in more active councils. 
The development of legislative committee systems was also a function 
of structural variables, although, contrary to our expectations, population 
and region had more influence here than expected. The key structural pre-
dictor was council size, with larger city councils having bigger committee 
systems. Frequency of council meetings and shorter council terms also were 
found to predict larger committee systems. 
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An important finding of this research was that city council committees 
had narrower policy roles, fewer policy functions, and handled less legisla-
tive business than we know to be true of congressional and state legislative 
committees. Some cities' committees seem to engage in the same types of 
activities that have been observed among state and congressional commit-
tees (e.g., Fenno 1973; Hamm 1980); namely, they study and propose legis-
lation, evaluate existing programs, and conduct hearings on legislative mat-
ters. The most common role for council committees was to study legislative 
proposals. Committees also regularly evaluated existing programs and initi-
ated legislation. But less than half conducted public hearings on bills and 
few were engaged in l,egislative oversight of the executive branch, a real 
departure from the findings of other legislative studies. 
Broader policy roles were found with fewer reform features and larger 
membership on legislative committees. The policy function index was 
higher among cities with less reform, larger councils, more committee 
members, and more committee meetings. But another aspect of structure-
the number of committees-had the greatest impact on policy functions. 
More committees produced narrower policy functions for all committees. 
Larger city councils and those with broad policy functions were associated 
with higher shares of a city's legislative business being conducted in com-
mittees. 
Despite some similarities to state and congressional committees, coun-
cil committee systems are different. Most of these differences are due to 
structural features of the city government. Reformism has produced execu-
tive dominance of city council policy-making. Both council-manager gov-
ernments and strong mayor-council systems represent structures in which 
the executive branch functions as the repository of information on policy-
making. City council committee systems are somewhat unnecessary-per-
haps nonrational (Krehbiel 1987)-except under weak mayor-council 
structures in which the council must develop expertise to make policy. Fur-
ther, many at-large, more volunteeristic councils do not have the same com-
pelling demands for committee structures. Their representational roles are 
not the same as that of a district-based congressman or legislator. The impli-
cation of this research is that structure, more than environment, affects pol-
icy-making by council committees. Where committee structures are more 
extensive, the policy-making functions and responsibilities will be greater. 
Council committees have a small impact on policy outputs. This finding 
runs contrary to congressional literature that demonstrates the powerful 
role of committees (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Cities with legislative 
committees and councils with more developed committee systems have 
significantly higher average spending per capita than other cities. But the 
presence of a committee in a functional policy area of city government 
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produced significantly higher spending in just two areas-fire protection 
and housing/community development. These findings show that in areas 
subject to distributive politics, committees may increase spending to benefit 
their constituents with fire protection and housing or community develop-
ment dollars. And although the policy findings are not consistent across 
areas, they demonstrate that the structurally-determined nature of council 
committee organization and development may affect policy-even if it is 
in a limited fashion. 
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